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I. INTRODUCTION 

The National Association of Accountants1 recently conducted a 
study of software accounting policy. As a result of interviews con­
ducted with executives of software manufacturing companies, it be­
came apparent that there was concern that the inability to reflect 
software expenditures on the balance sheet adversely affected the abil­
ity to raise debt or equity capital. This view was confirmed when it 
questionnaire was mailed to software company executives. 
In order to test the views of bankers and financial analysts, two 
different questionnaires, employing two different research methodolo­
gies, were mailed to two groups of commercial lending officers. A 
third questionnaire was mailed to financial analysts. Response to the 
two commercial lending officer surveys revealed the software compa­
nies that capitalize some software expenditures find it less difficult to 
obtain bank financing than do companies that expense all software 
costs. Responses to the financial analysts' survey revealed that some 
analysts prefer software companies that capitalize certain software ex­
penditures. Others prefer companies that expense all software costs. 
II. PRIOR STUDIES OF THE EFFECT OF CERTAIN ACCOUNTING 

POLICIES ON BANK LENDING DECISIONS AND 

STOCK PRICE 

During the course of these interviews, several subjects expressed 
the view that the inability to place software costs on the balance sheet 
would adversely affect a software firm's ability to raise capital. This 
feeling was reinforced by the responses received from software vendor 
companies. In that questionnaire, 48.5 percent of privately held 
software companies and 30.2 percent of the public companies surveyed 
agreed that the inability to include software costs on the balance sheet 
adversely affects the ability to raise capital. 
The view that accounting policy affects a company's stock price 
or the ability to raise debt capital has previously been expressed. In 
1965, J. L. O'DonnelP examined the price earnings ratio trend of 37 
1. The National Association of Accountants is the second largest accounting mem­
bership organization in the world (the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
is the largest). It recently moved its world-wide headquarters from New York City to 10 
Paragon Drive, Montvale, New Jersey 07645. It has nearly 400 local chapters and sponsors 
a variety of educational activities, including conferences and seminars. It also funds and 
publishes research and publishes MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, a monthly referred journal 
with a circulation of 97,000. 
2. O'Donnell, Relationship Between Reported Earnings and Stock Prices in the Elec­
tric Utility Industry, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, January 1965 at 135. 
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public utilities for the period 1949 through 1961. He determined that 
accounting policy can affect stock price. His second study3 produced 
the same result. On the other hand, Edward L. Summers4 studied the 
effect of investment tax credit, interperiod tax allocation, and funds 
flow statements of stock prices in the airline industry. He found no 
statistically significant impact. George J. Staubus,S in studying the as­
sociation between several accounting variables and stock price, con­
cluded that investors found income before depreciation to be more 
useful than income after depreciation. 
An experimental study conducted by R. E. Jensen6 concluded 
that variations in depreciation and inventory accounting policies af­
fected the opinions of analysts. W. J. Bums, Jr.,1 concluded that in­
ventory policy does not affect pricing, advertising, and production 
decisions. The three studies, conducted by T. R. Dyckman,8 reached 
conflicting results. His first study concluded that variations in inven­
tory methods can influence financial statement readers, a conclusion 
that is diametrically opposed to that reached by Bums. Dyckman's 
second study9 concluded that inventory method does not influence de­
cision-making. His third study,lO however, reached the opposite con­
clusion. Dopuch and Ronen,11 using students for financial statement 
readers, concluded that inventory policy does influence readers of fi­
nancial statements. Mlynarczyk's study12 compared the flow-through 
and deferred method of tax accounting. He reached the same conclu­
sion. Falk and Ophirl3 found that investors react both to the content 
3. O'Donnell, Further Observation on Reported Earnings and Stock Prices, THE Ac­
COUNTING REVIEW, July 1968 at 549. 
4. Summers, Observation ofEffects ofUsing Alternative Reporting Practices, THE Ac­
COUNTING REVIEW, April 1968 at 257. 
5. Staubus, The Association of Financial Accounting Variables with Common Stock 
Values, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, January 1965 at 119. 
6. Jensen, An Experimental Design for Study ofEffects ofAccounting Variations in 
Decision Making, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Autumn 1966 at 224. 
7. Bruns, Inventory Valuation and Management Decisions, THE ACCOUNTING RE­
VIEW, April 1965 at 345. 
8. Dyckman, On the Investment Decisions, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, April 1964 
at 285. 
9. Dyckman, The Effects ofAlternative Accounting Techniques on Certain Manage­
ment Decisions, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Spring 1964 at 91. 
10. Dyckman, On the Effects ofEarnings-Trends. Size and Inventory Valuation Pr0­
cedures in Evaluating a Business Firm, RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENT 175­
185 (Jaedicke, et. al. eds. 1966). 
11. Dopuch & Ronen, The Effects ofAlternative Inventory Valuation Methods, JOUR­
NAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Autumn 1973 at 191. 
12. Mlynarczyk, An Empirical Study ofAccounting Methods and Stock Prices, EM­
PIRICAL RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES, 1969 at 63. 
13. Falk & Ophir, The Influence ofDifferences in Accounting Policies on Investment 
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and form of disclosure. 
There have been at least three major studies dealing with the ef­
fect of accounting policies on bank lending decisions. In 1970, T. N. 
Jain conducted a study14 of the effects of tax accounting methods on 
bank lending decisions. In that study, financial data for two compa­
nies were sent to 110 lending officers at large banks. The high re­
sponse rate of 67 percent (74 responses) was due, in part, to the fact 
that most of the bankers were also contacted personally, and a follow­
up letter was sent to the remainder. The financial data for the two 
companies was identical in all respects, except for the method of ac­
counting for income taxes. One company used comprehensive alloca­
tion and one used partial allocation. The study found that the method 
of accounting for income taxes does influence lending decisions. 
The second studylS was conducted by A. A. EI-Arabi in 1977. In 
this study, two sets of financial statements were prepared for two hy­
pothetical firms. The data for both sets of financial statements were 
identical except for the accounting principles used. One set used the 
FIFO method of inventory valuation and the straight-line depreciation 
method. The second used LIFO and the sum of the years digits 
method. The sample consisted of two groups of banks. Group one, 
consisting of 332 banks (of which 37 percent responded), was sent the 
FIFO/straight-line data. Group two, consisting of 331 banks (of 
which 32 percent responded), was sent the LIFO/sum of the years 
digits data. The study found that the accounting principles used did 
affect the lending decision. 
The third study was conducted by M. M. EI-Maksy.16 In this 
study, 1,050 loan officers from 240 banks were divided into seven 
groups. Responses were received from 267 lenders representing 143 
banks. The first group received financial data containing no F ASB 
No. 33 information. Each of the treatment groups received one piece 
of FASB No. 33 data (either constant dollar, current cost, or both) 
which was either presented in the notes to the financial statements or 
Decisions," JOURNALS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Spring 1973 at 108. See also Falk, 
"Use of Financial Statements for Investment Decision Making in Israel's Companies," 
Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University (1971). 
14. Jain, "A Study of the Effects of Alternative Methods of Accounting for Income 
Taxes on Term Loan Decisions," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University (1970). 
15. EI-Arabi, "The Effects of Accounting Alternatives on Lending Decisions of 
Commercial Bankers," Ph.D. dissertation, the Louisiana State University and Agricultural 
and Mechanical College (1977). 
16. El-Maksy, "A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB 
Statement No. 33 on Lending Decisions," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York 
(1983). 
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on the face of the income statement and notes. The study found that 
lending decisions for the control group were not significantly different 
statistically from that of the treatment groups, although lending deci­
sions for the treatment groups were less favorable than those for the 
control groups in 94 percent of the cases. The groups receiving con­
stant dollar data made lending decisions that were not significantly 
different statistically from those decisions made by lenders who re­
ceived current cost data. 
III. RESULTS OF THE FIRST CoMMERCIAL LENDING 

OFFICER SURVEY 

A. Background 
In a prior study,11 telephone interviews were conducted with 
more than twenty individuals representing several facets of the 
software industry. Eighteen individuals representing seven software 
manufacturers and internal users were personally interviewed on com­
pany premises. A questionnaire survey was also mailed to executives 
of software manufacturing companies. Information obtained from the 
interviews and mail survey revealed that a significant number of 
software company executives were of the opinion that the inability to 
reflect software expenditures on the balance sheet adversely affected 
their ability to raise debt or equity capital. 
To test the validity of this view, two separate surveys employing 
different research methodologies were constructed and were mailed to 
different groups of commercial lending officers. A third survey was 
mailed to financial analysts. 
B. The First Commercial Lending Officer Survey 
Two questi~nnaires and related financial data were mailed to two 
separate groups of commercial lending officers,18 chosen from banks 
with assets in excess of $500 million. Data for Campbell Corporation, 
a company that capitalizes software costs with net income of 
$2,552,107, $2,213,154, and $903,131 for 1982, 1981, and 1980, re­
spectively, was sent to 174 commercial lending officers. Campbell 
17. R. McGee, ACCOUNTING FOR SOfTWARE COSTS (1984). 
18. A similar methodology was employed by EI-Arabi in "The Effects of Accounting 
Alternatives on Lending Decisions of Commercial Bankers," Ph.D. dissertation, the Loui­
siana State University and Agricultural College (1977). See also EI-Maksy, "A Theoretical 
and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lending Deci­
sions," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York (1983), where a slightly different 
methodology was employed. 
710 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:705 
Corporation is a real, publicly held software company. The financial 
data sent was authentic. Only the company name was changed. 
Data for Edwards Corporation was sent to 174 other commercial 
lending officers. The only difference between Edwards and Campbell 
was that Edwards expenses all software costs. Edwards had a 
$2,103,000 net loss in 1982 and net income of $498,000 and $301,000 
in 1981 and 1980, respectively. 
Twenty responses were received for Campbell and thirty for Ed­
wards. Responses to the individual questions are summarized below. 
QUESTION ONE: 
How large a line of credit would your bank be willing to grant to this 
Company? 
TABLE ONE 
Campbell Corporation Edwards Corporation 
Number of Number of 
Responses Amount Responses Amount 
S $ -0­ 17 $ -0­
1 7S0K-IM 1 1M 
1 1M 1 3-6M 
1 I-2M 1 4M 
2 2m 1 4.SM 
3 3M 6 SM 
1 3.SM 1 6M 
1 4.SM 1 lOM 
2 SM 1 lO-ISM 
2 7M 
1 7.SM 
Total 20 30 
-
Table One summarizes the responses. Twenty-five percent of the 
commercial lending officers responding to the Campbell questionnaire 
would not grant a line of credit, compared to 57 percent of those re­
sponding to Edwards. For those who would grant a line of credit, the 
amounts ranged as high as $7.5 million for Campbell and $15 million 
for Edwards. A test of variability determined that the responses re­
ceived from the two groups was not statistically different at the 10 
percent level, even though the reject rate for Edwards (57 percent) was 
more than twice that for Campbell (25 percent). Perhaps this result is 
due to the low response rate and high degree of variability. 
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QUESTION Two: 
Ifyour bank would not approve a line ofcredit for this company, 
please indicate why the application would be denied. 
The banks denying Campbell's application responded as follows: 
1. Too many questions raised in financial statements, i.e., 
purpose of line (to replace other bank?), carry receivables, carry 
proprietary software costs? We also question the quality of the fi­
nancial statements: there is no cash/funds flow, no reconcilement 
of net worth, no amortization of property and equipment on the 
income statement, capitalized leases do not appear to be on the bal­
ance sheet and write-off of computer costs (in 4-6 years) does not 
appear to be taking place on P & L. 
2. All needs appear to be permanent financing. It is impossi­
ble to determine if a line can be repaid by the liquidation of short 
term assets. 
3. Concerns: leverage, vulnerability of main product line in 

competitive environment; bulk of assets (computers and software) 

could become obsolete rapidly. 

4. The application would be denied until further information 

concerning the following could be obtained: an accounts receivable 

aging, projections indicating future profitability, capital expendi­

tures, and the direction of the company. This would include pro­

jected income statements and balance sheets. We would also need a 

recent interim statement and a sources and uses of funds statement 

dated December 31, 1982. 

5. Interest expense on bonds will be 11 percent of $20 million, 

or $2.2 million, which wo.uld entirely deplete earnings based on 

1982 figures. 

The banks denying Edward's application responded as follows: 
1. Prior to my bank venturing a decision regarding this 

company's ability to receive from us a line of credit and/or a term 

loan, more in-depth analysis would need to be made. Certainly, we 

would wish to view pro forma balance sheets (five years) and in­

come statements (five years). The pro formas would aid us in ob­

taining some insight into the company's future financial needs and 

management objectives. 

The tremendous sales growth that the company has enjoyed 

during the past five years has certainly been a contributing force in 

the company's need for external funds. The pro formas that the 

bank would require would aid us in determining how much of the 

external funds would be needed to support the increased receivables 
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and inventory (short term), and how much external funds would be 
needed to support the increase in fixed assets (long term). 
If the company's projections reveal a continuation of the rapid 
sales growth, we could conclude that repayment of a portion of the 
external funds would not be repaid until the rate of sales growth 
declines. Of course, those funds that will support the receivables 
and inventory will be considered to be self-liquidating. 
We would request a break out of the G & A expenses so as to 
better calculate the company's G & A trends. Depreciation expense 
is needed to better analyze the company's cash flow and to calculate 
more revealing ratios. 
The company's sales growth and interest expenses were very 
important in the decline of profitability for the Edwards Corpora­
tion. Next year, the servicing of the debenture, interest and sinking 
fund will add additional strain to profitability. 
2. There is a significant increase in long term subordinated 
convertible debt with sinking fund requirements of $1.5 million. 
Long term debt should provide a sufficient operating fund for the 
near term. There is no explanation for the loss other than increased 
cost of goods sold. 
3. The company is not generating sufficient cash to support 
its current financing costs. 
4. (a) Nature of business; (b) operating deficiencies; (c) risk 
of upcoming year; (d) uncertain nature of accounts receivable, oper­
ating expenses, payable and subordination convertible debentures; 
(e) increasing international business. 
5. In general, we do not make loans without first hand 
knowledge and assessment of management. In particular, it is not 
clear what the purpose of the line would be given their present 
abundance of cash resources. 
6. (a) Severe operating loss due to excessive increases in ex­
penses; (b) insufficient financial data regarding expenses; (c) heavy 
current and long-term credit obligations; (d) no knowledge of man­
agement and its ability; (e) no interim financial data for any portion 
of 1983. 
7. (a) Revenue recognition methods; (b) product.is subject 
to obsolescence without warning. 
8. (a) The investment in the building is too much for the 
company to carry (interest plus depreciation); (b) the three year life 
on computers used until 1981 was too long and the company has 
not shown an operating profit since the change. 
9. (a) Insufficient information; (b) source and application of 
funds statement for 1982 was not given; (c) value or potential future 
income in program library being developed, market penetration and 
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permanence for one to five years; (d) this company is highly lever­
aged, and if present liquidity is used, there will be no place to go 
except lender financial losses with no valuable assets to liquidate. 
10. The company is unable to generate operating profit. Cash 
flow is inadequate. Speculation is company having to discount be­
low costs to meet competition. 
11. (a) Downward trend in savings; (b) no clear source of re­
payment; (c) no evident secondary source of repayment; (d) a $6 
million revolver is already in place. 
12. There is a question as to the quality of receivables. An 
aging schedule would be helpful. The line of business makes the 
company a high risk venture. 
13. The company is insolvent based on the times interest 
earned ratio. It is also highly leveraged. Declining profitability and 
insufficient cash flow add to this credit risk. The company also has 
future debt obligations that would further deter their ability to ser­
vice their debt. 
14. (a) Volatile industry; (b) weak operating earnings; 
(c) excessive fixed asset expansion for a company that does not have 
excess cash to allocate to fixed assets and the nature of which does 
not require ownership of land and buildings. The company can op­
erate from leased facilities; (d) the company incurred operating 
losses that will be compounded by the interest expense on the addi­
tional debt; (e) evidence of unsound judgment on the part of 
management. 
15. (a) Existing $6 million line of credit; (b) deteriorating 
profits; (c) receivables collection. 
16. Account receivable turnover is slow (over 100 days). 
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With an operating loss experienced in 1982, the company could be 
running into a situation of evergreen credit. 
QUESTION THREE: 
What rate of interest would you charge? 
TABLE Two 
Cam:ebell Corporation Edwards Coryoration 
Number of Number of 
Responses Rate Res:eonses Rate 
5 N/A 16 N/A 
1 11.00 1 11.00 
1 11.25 4 12.00 
1 11.58 1 12.63 
2 12.00 1 12.75 
1 12.22 1 12.78 
1 12.50 1 13.16 
1 12.78 4 13.33 
1 13.00 1 15.00 
1 13.06 
1 13.16 
2 13.33 
1 13.53 
1 13.75 
Totals 20 30 
-
Table Two summarizes the response to this question. 19 Interest 
rates have been adjusted in order to account for compensating bal­
ances. A test of variability revealed that there was not a significant 
different (at the 10 percent level) between the rate charged to Camp­
bell and that charged to Edwards. This finding concurs with that 
found in the Jain study.20 
QUESTION FOUR: 
What additional terms would you impose? 
19. The interest rate provided was adjusted to take into account any compensating 
balance that would be required. The prime rate was 11 percent at the time the question­
naire was mailed. The rate did not change until after all responses had been received. 
20. Jain, supra note 14, at 271. Jain also found no difference between groups for 
compensating balances, minimum working capital, maximum additional debt, maximum 
dividends or maximum officers salaries. Id. 
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The response to this question varied widely, but included the fol­
lowing terms: 
1. compensating balance ranging from 5-15 percent, and/or a 
commitment fee ranging from 1/8 percent to 1/2 percent; 
2. credit line granted up to 60-75 percent of accounts receiva­
ble. Procure a monthly account receivable aging schedule; 
3. loan secured by inventory or other assets, security agree­
ment on property, equipment and/or receivables; 
4. quarterly financial data with 90 day review; 
5. convert line to term loan with 3-5 year payout; 
6. annual cleanup with zero balance for 30-60 days; 
7. restrictions on capital expenditures, lease obligations, 
working capital, dividends, additional debt, bonuses, officers' sala­
ries, and changes in ownership; and 
8. require owner guarantee, approval of subordinated debt 
holders, and key insurance. 
QUESTION FIVE: 
If, instead ofa line of credit, the company had applied for a 
$2,000,000, five year loan, would your bank grant the loan? 
TABLE THREE 
Campbell Corporation Edwards Corporation 
Number of Number of 
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
Yes 10 50% 9 30% 
No 10 50% 21 70% 
Totals 20 30 
-
Table Three summarizes the responses to this question. 
Although a larger percentage of lending officers said they would lend 
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to Campbell than to Edwards, the chi-square test indicated that this 
difference was not significant at the 10 percent level. 
QUESTION SIX: 
Do you consider this loan to be extremely risky, risky, marginal, safe, 
or extremely safe? 
TABLE FOUR A 
Campbell Corporation Edwards Corporation 
Do you consider Number of Number of 
this loan to be: Responses Percentage Res~onses Percentage 
Extremely risky 2 10% 7 23% 
Risky 4 20 12 40 
Marginal 5 25 9 30 
Safe 9 45 2 7 
Extremely safe 0 0 0 0 
Totals 20 30 
--
TABLE FOUR B 
Campbell 
Corporation 
Edwards 
Corporation 
Points 
Number of 
Responses Points 
Number of 
Responses Points 
Extremely risky 
Risky 
Marginal 
Safe 
Extremely safe 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
2 
4 
5 
9 
0 
10 
16 
15 
18 
0 
7 
12 
9 
2 
0 
35 
48 
27 
4 
0 
20 
-
59 
-
30 
-
114 
-
Weighted Average 2.95 
Marginal 
3.80 
Risky 
Median Marginal Risky 
Mode Safe Risky 
Table Four shows that bankers tended to view a loan to Edwards 
as more risky than one to Campbell. The chi "square test indicated 
that this difference was significant at the 10 percent level. 
- -
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QUESTION SEVEN: 

Ifyour bank would not approve this term loan, please indicate why 
the application would be denied. 
The responses to this question were similar to those responses to 
question two. 
QUESTION EIGHT: 
What rate of interest would you charge for the term loan? 
TABLE FIVE 
CamEbell Corporation Edwards Corporation 
Number of Number of 
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
10 N/A 21 N/A 
1 11.75 2 12.00 
2 12.11 1 12.50 
3 13.33 2 13.33 
1 13.50 1 13.68 
1 13.61 1 13.89 
1 13.89 2 15.29 
1 14.69 
Totals 20 30 
Table Five summarizes the responses to this question.21 The av­
erage interest rate charged to Campbell is 13.165 percent, compared to 
13.473 percent for Edwards. Although the rate charged Edwards is 
somewhat higher than that charged Campbell, the difference is not 
significant at the 10 percent level.22 
QUESTION NINE: 
What compensating balance would be required? 
Ten banks suggested a willingness to grant a term loan to Camp­
bell. Eight would require a compensating balance, ranging from 5 to 
20 percent and averaging 9.7 percent. Of the nine banks that would 
21. The interest rate given was adjusted to take into account any compensating bal­
ance that would be required. The prime rate was 11 percent at the time the questionnaire 
was mailed, and the rate did not change until after all responses had been received. 
22. Jain, supra note 14, at 271. 
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lend to Edwards, six would require a compensating balance, ranging 
from 5 to 15 percent and averaging 10.6 percent. 
QUESTION TEN: 
What restrictions on working capital WfJuld be imposed? 
Of the ten bankers that would lend to Campbell, three would re­
quire a. $10 million minimum in working capital. One would require 
$5 million. One bank would require that the current level 
($10,614,400) be maintained. Others would require a current ratio of 
1.5:1 to 2.1:1 or a working capital/asset ratio of 18 percent or a work­
ing capital/revenue ratio of 35 percent. One bank would place no re­
strictions on working capital. Responses for the Edwards Corporation 
were similar. Tables Six and Seven provide a more detailed break­
down of the responses for both companies. 
QUESTION ELEVEN: 
How much additional debt would the company be allowed to incur? 
Five of the ten Campbell responses would not allow additional 
long-term debt without bank approval. Two banks would allow an 
additional $1 million. One bank would allow an additional $5 million. 
Two banks would require a debt/worth ratio of 2.0: 1. 
Of the nine Edwards responses, six would not permit additional 
debt. One bank would not place a restriction on additional debt. An­
other would allow $2.5. million for each of the next five years. One 
would require a 3.0: 1 debt/worth ratio. 
QUESTION TWELVE: 
What is the maximum annual dividend that could be paid? 
Four of the ten Campbell responses would not permit any divi­
dends. One bank would impose no restrictions on dividends. Other 
respondents would allow dividends ranging from 10 to 50 percent of 
net income or cash flow. 
Four of the nine Edwards responses would not permit dividends. 
Two others would permit dividends up to 25 percent of earnings. One 
would require a debt/worth ratio 2.5:1. 
QUESTION THIRTEEN: 
What additional terms would you impose? 
Most bankers would impose additional terms for both Campbell 
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and Edwards. The additional terms are summarized in Tables Six and 
Seven. 
TABLE SIX 
Banks Approving a Term Loan for Campbell Corporation 

Summary of Restrictions· 

Bank Question 10 Question II Question 12 Question 13 
No. Working Capital Additional Debt Maximum Annual Dividend Additional Terms 
$5 million $5 million None Term loan agreement 
minimum with usual covenants. 
2 $10 million No long term debt No response Liability to stockholders 
minimum of more than $1 equity ratio not more 
million without than 1.8:1; No capital 
bank approval expenditures in excess of 
$1 million or purchase of 
treasury stock without 
bank approval 
3 $10 million None without None without permission Negative pledge on assets, 
minimum permission, no change in 
including additional management, limit capital 
leases expenditures and lease 
commitments 
4 Not to go below None without bank None without bank approval Net worth and liquidity 
current levels approval tests 
($1O.6M) 
5 Working capital as Debt to worth ratio 10% of net profit after taxes Secured by fixed assets 
a percentage of should not exceed 
assets should be 2.0 in 1983, 1.8 in 
maintained at 1984, 1.7 in 1985 
18% and should continue 
to improve over the 
5 year period 
6 Current ratio Debt to worth not 10% of net cash flow from No net increase to fixed 
1.5: I, working to exceed 2.0: I, no operations after long-term assets; courseware 
capital 35% of additional long-term debt service construction costs net 
revenues debt without balance maintained at 
approval 45% (or less) of annual 
dollar sales rate; quarterly 
financials 
7 $10 million Up to $1 million None No dividends or outside 
minimum more, depending on debt financing without 
use and need prior approval. Not to be 
used for working capital 
8 Maintain current None 30% net after tax None stated 
ratio (2.2: I) 
9 No restriction Depends on purpose No restrictions Should be secured, 
and ratio trends guaranty of 20% 
stockholders, loan 
agreement, key insurance 
if necessary 
10 Minimum current None 50% of net income None stated 
ratio 2.0:1 
TABLE SEVEN 

Banks Approving a Term Loan for Edwards Corporation 
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Summary ofRestrictions 
Bank Question 10 
No. Working Capital 
Required quick 
ratio 1.75: I, 
current ratio 
2.00:1 
2 	 Minimum current 
ratio of 2: I and 
working capital 
minimum 510 
mi1Iion 
3 	 1.2 current ratio, 
58 mi1Iion 
minimum 
4 	 57 mi1Iion 

minimum 

5 	 Maintain 1.75:1 
current ratio 
6 	 57 mi1Iion 
minimum 
7 	 1.75: I current 
ratio 55 mi1Iion 
minimum 
8 	 Secured by fixed 
assets with an 
80% advance 
9 	 1.75: I current 
ratio 57.5 mi1Iion 
minimum 
Question II 
Additional Debt 
None 
None without 
approval 
None 
No other senior debt 
or capital leases 
without prior bank 
approval 
None without bank 
approval 
No restriction stated 
52.5 million each 
year for next 5 years 
Must maintain debt/ 
worth ratio of 3.00: I 
No additional debt 
without bank 
approval other than 
normal trade 
payables 
Question 12 
Maximum Annual Dividend 
None 
None 
One year after profitable 
operations, 25% of after-tax 
earnings 
None, without prior bank 
approval 
Dependent on earnings and 
cash flow 
No restriction stated 
25% of earnings 
Allowed if debt/worth ratio 
remains 2.5: I or below 
None 
Question 13 

Additional Terms 

Security agreements on 
property and equipment, 
accounts receivable; $2 
million guarantee of 
payment 
Profitability within a 
predetermined time 
frame; actual performance 
tracking closely to 
projected, maximum 
leverage; negative pledge 
on assets; no other debt; 
dividends; no treasury 
stock purchases; no asset 
dispositions or mergers or 
acquisition unless prior 
approval given; 
Limit capital 
expenditures; leverage 
covenants-step up over 
course of loan; earnings 
recapture; 
Net worth floor of 511 
million; no capital 
expenditures above a 
certain amount without 
approval; security, 
possibly, if no good 
evidence of turnaround 
No borrowings from 
other sources; no 
pledging of any assets; 
minimum working capital 
ratio; maximum debt/ 
worth ratio; quarterly 
financial statements 
At the end of 2 years, if 
the company has not 
returned to profitable 
operations, the bank 
would reserve the right to 
restructure debt 
repayment 
Maximum debt/worth 
ratio of 2.00: I 
None stated 
Security agreements on 
accounts receivables, all 
machinery, equipment, 
furniture, fixtures, 2nd 
lien on all previously 
encumbered fixed assets; 
restrictive covenants on 
capital accounts 
- -
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QUESTION FOURTEEN: 
The bank's total assets are: 
Campbell Edwards 
More than $5 billion 5 4 
$5 billion or less 15 26 
20 30 
A correlation between bank size and other questionnaire re­
sponses was not made due to the small sample size.23 
QUESTION FIFfEEN: 
The person completing this questionnaire has had-years experience 
in a loan department. 
Campbell Edwards 
Two or less 9 9 
More than two, less 
than five 0 3 
Five to ten 8 11 
More than ten 2 6 
No response 1 1 
20 30 
--
A correlation between years of loan experience and other ques­
23. The EI-Arabi study found that bank size was not a significant factor in the lend­
ing decision. See supra note 15. 
- -
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tionnaire responses was not made due to the small sample size. 24 
QUESTION SIXTEEN: 
The position of the person completing this questionnaire is: 
Campbell Edwards 
Senior or executive vice 
president or other 
senior officer 0 4 
Vice president, secretary 
or treasurer 5 11 
Assistant vice president or 
other assistant officer 12 13 
Not an officer 3 2 
20 30 
A correlation between title and other questionnaire responses was 
not made due to the small sample size.25 
QUESTION SEVENTEEN: 
The office where this questionnaire is being completed is located in 
the: 
Campbell Edwards 
Northeast 1 8 
South 10 9 
North Central 6 8 
West 2 4 
No response 1 1 
20 30 
- -
A correlation between geographic location and other question­
naire responses was not made due to the small sample size.26 
24. The El-Maksy and El-Arabi studies concluded that the experience is not a signifi­
cant factor in the loan decision making process. See supra notes IS and 16. 
25. The EI-Arabi study found that rank was a significant factor in the lending deci­
sion. See supra note IS. El-Maksy found, however, that sex and membership in a banking 
association were not significant factors. See supra note 16. 
26. The El-Arabi and El-Maksy studies both concluded that the bank's geographic 
location is not a significant factor in the lending decision. El-Maksy also found that the 
amount of time spent responding to the questionnaire was insignificant. See supra notes IS 
and 16. 
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C. Summary and Conclusions 
Companies that do not capitalize software costs find it more diffi­
cult to raise debt capital than companies that do capitalize such costs. 
This fact was brought to the author's attention during the course of 
the interviews with executives from software vending companies. It 
was reinforced by the responses received on the software vendor ques­
tionnaire, which revealed that a substantial proportion of software 
vendor company executives feel that not capitalizing software costs 
hinders their ability to raise debt capital. Furthermore, the response 
to question six of the banker questionnaire indicated that bank lending 
officers view a loan to a company that expenses software costs as more 
risky than a loan to a company that capitalizes software costs. 
Although insignificant at the ten percent level, some of the re­
sponses to the other questions in the banker questionnaire lead in the 
same direction. Seventeen of thirty (57%) lending officers would not 
grant a line of credit to Edwards, compared to five out of twenty 
(25%) for Campbell. Question two revealed that one of the main rea­
sons for the loan officer's reluctance to lend was the weak operating 
performance of Edwards. Several banks mentioned that performance 
as a reason for not lending to Edwards. None of the bankers that 
received the Campbell questionnaire gave poor operating performance 
as a reason for not granting a line of credit to Campbell. Campbell 
showed 1982 net income of $2,552,107, due to its software accounting 
policy, compared to a 1982 loss of $2,103,000 for Edwards. 
For those banks that would lend to Campbell or Edwards, the 
rate of interest charged, although not significant at the ten percent 
level, is higher for Edwards than for Campbell. 
CamEbell Edwards 
Q-3 Interest rate charged for 
a line of credit 
12.566% 12.760% 
Q-8 Interest rate charged for 
a term loan 
13.165 13.473 
When asked whether the bank would grant a $2 million term 
loan, half of the Campbell bankers responded in the affirmative com­
pared to 30 percent for Edwards. 
The interviews and questionnaire responses point to one conclu­
sion. A company that capitalizes software costs will find it easier to 
raise debt capital than will a company that expenses these costs. 
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IV. REsULTS OF THE SECOND COMMERCIAL LENDING OFFICER 
SURVEY 
A. Methodology 
The sample for this survey consisted of 1,002 commercial lending 
officers, obtained randomly from a population of 5,700. The list was 
purchased from a company that sells mailing lists. Five data packets 
were returned as undeliverable. Forty-five usable responses were re­
ceived. The response ratio was 4.5 percent. The material sent to com­
mercial lending officers inc1uded27 a cover letter, questionnaire, 
postpaid return envelope, modified annual reports for both Campbell 
Corporation and Edwards Corporation, an accounts receivable aging 
schedule for both companies, and a listing of certain key financial ra­
tios28 for both companies. 
B. Findings 
The responses can be subdivided into four distinct categories. Of 
the forty-five usable responses received, twenty-eight (62.2%) favored 
Campbell Corporation over Edwards Corporation.29 Five responses 
(11.1 %) favored Edwards. Six responses (13.3%) indicated they 
would treat the companies equally, but did not give any reason for 
similar treatment. Six responses (13.3%) indicated they would treat 
the companies equally, because a company's software accounting pol­
icy would not influence their lending decision.30 These subdivisions 
27. Jain, supra note 14. 
28. The ratios chosen for inclusion in this list were selected partially based on a study 
that listed the ratios most frequently used by lending officers. See EI-Maksy, "A Theoreti­
cal and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lending Deci· 
sion," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York at 74-76 (1983). 
29. Campbell Corporation capitalized certain software expenditures. Edwards Cor­
poration expensed all software costs. 
30. One of the deficiencies of using the research methodology employed in this sur­
vey is that some bankers may state that their decision· to lend or not to lend is not infiu­
enced by a company's accounting policy, whereas their actual lending decisions may be so 
influenced. This deficiency can be avoided by sending different data to two different groups 
of bankers, as was done in the first survey. This approach may also be criticized, however, 
because the samples surveyed are different. Such criticism may be overcome by sending 
data for both companies to the same sample, as was done in the second survey. 
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are summarized in Table Eight. 
TABLE EIGHT 
Bankers Favoring Campbell and Edwards 
Number of 
Reseonses Percentage 
Bankers favoring Campbell 28 62.2% 
Bankers favoring Edwards 5 11.1 
Campbell and Edwards treated 
equally-no reason given 6 13.3 
Campbell and Edwards treated 
equally because accounting 
policy should not affect the 
lending decision 6 13.3 
Total responses 45 
QUESTION ONE: 
Question one asked whether the bank would grant a $3 million, 
five year unsecured loan to Campbell and Edwards. The responses 
revealed that 27 bankers (61.4%) would grant the loan to Campbell, 
but only 12 bankers (27.3%) would do so for Edwards. Seventeen of 
forty-five bankers responding to this question (38.6%) would not grant 
the loan to Campbell, compared to nearly three out of four (72.7%) 
who would deny a loan request by Edwards. 
TABLE NINE 
Camebell Edwards 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Yes 
No 
27 
17 
61.4% 
38.6 
12 
32 
27.3% 
72.7 
44 
-
100.0% 44 
-
100.0% 
-­
QUESTION Two: 
This question asked what interest rate would be charged. Of the 
20 lending officers that gave a rate for both Campbell and Edwards, 
eleven (55%) would charge Campbell a lower rate, one (5%) would 
charge Edwards a lower rate, and eight (40%) would charge both 
- -
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companies the same rate. Rates given varied from prime to prime plus 
four percent. Rates charged Edwards were generally higher than 
those charged Campbell. The weighted average rate for Campbell was 
prime plus 1.2%, compared with prime rate plus 1.9% for Edwards. 
The median rates for Campbell and Edwards were prime plus 1.0% 
and prime plus 1.75%, respectively. The mode for each company was 
prime plus 1 %. 
TABLE TEN A 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Lower rate for Campbell 11 55% 
Lower rate for Edwards 1 5 
Same rate for both 8 40 
20 	 100 
TABLE TEN B 
Campbell 	 Edwards 
Rate Charged Number of Number of 
Prime Plus Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
0 1 3.1% 	 -% 
0.5 	 9 28.1 3 13.6 
1.0 	 10 31.3 5 22.7 
1.5 	 2 6.2 3 13.6 
2.0 	 8 25.0 4 18.2 
2.5 	 1 3.1 3 13.6 
3.0 	 1 3.1 
3.5 	 1 4.5 
4.0 	 3 13.6 
32 22 
Weighted 

Average Rate Prime plus 1.2% Prime plus 1.9% 

Median Rate Prime plus 1.0% Prime plus 1.75% 

Mode Prime plus 1.0% Prime plus 1.0% 

QUESTION THREE: 
Question three asked, "How would you rate this loan for each 
corporation?" Responses indicated that a loan to Campbell Corpora­
tion was generally regarded as safer than a loan to Edwards Corpora­
- -
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tion. Only one banker (2.3%) rated a loan to Campbell as being 
extremely risky, compared with thirteen bankers (31.7%) who classi­
fied the Edwards loan as extremely risky. Twelve bankers (27.9%) 
rated a loan to Campbell as risky, compared with sixteen (39.0%) for 
Edwards. A loan to Campbell was considered marginal by thirteen 
. bankers (30.2%), compared with ten (24.4%) for Edwards. A Camp­
bell loan was considered safe by seventeen bankers (39.5%), compared 
with two bankers (4.9%) who viewed an Edwards loan as safe. No 
bankers rated either Campbell or Edwards as extremely safe. The av­
erage response indicated that a loan to Campbell would be considered 
marginal, whereas a loan to Edwards would be considered risky. 
TABLE ELEVEN A 
Cam~bell Edwards 
Number of Number of 
Responses Percentage Responses Percentage 
Extremely risky 1 2.3% 13 31.7% 
Risky 12 27.9 16 39.0 
Marginal 13 30.2 10 24.4 
Safe 17 39.5 2 4.9 
Extremely safe 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Totals 43 41 
TABLE ELEVEN B 
Cam~bell Edwards 
Points 
Number of 
Responses Points 
Number of 
Res~onses Points 
Extremely risky 
Risky 
Marginal 
Safe 
Extremely safe 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
12 
13 
17 
0 -
5 
48 
39 
34 
0 
13 
16 
10 
2 
0 
65 
64 
30 
4 
0 -
43 
-
126 
-
41 
-
163 
-
Weighted Average 2.93 
Marginal 
3.98 
Risky 
Median Marginal Risky 
Mode Safe Risky 
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QUESTION FOUR: 

This question asked, "On a scale of 0% to 100%, what are the 
chances that the corporation will default on the loan, if made?" Of the 
41 bankers responding to this question for both Campbell and Ed­
wards, twenty-four (58.5%) rated Campbell as the better risk, six 
bankers (14.6%) rated Edwards as safer, and eleven bankers (26.8%) 
rated the corporations as equal risks. 
Of the forty bankers giving percentages (one respondent answered 
"same"), Campbell was given a 23.5% chance of default, compared 
with 46.2% for Edwards. The median chance of default was 15% for 
Campbell and 50% for Edwards. The mode for 5% for each 
company. 
TABLE TWELVE A 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Lower percentage chance of 
default for Campbell 24 58.5% 
Lower percentage chance of 
default for Edwards 6 14.6 
Same chance of default for 
Campbell and Edwards 11 26.8 
41 
TABLE TWELVE B 
CamEbell Edwards 
Percentage Number of Number of 
Chance of Default ResEonses Percentage Responses Percentage 
o - 10 19 47.5% 10 25.0% 
11 - 20 4 10.0 3 7.5 
21 - 30 6 15.0 2 5.0 
31 - 40 3 7.5 3 7.5 
41 - 50 2 5.0 2 5.0 
51 - 60 1 2.5 4 10.0 
61 - 70 3 7.5 5.0 
71 - 80 0 6 15.0 
81 - 90 0 5 12.5 
91 - 100 2 - 5.0 3 7.5 
40 100.0% 40 100.0 
- - ­ - - ­
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Approximate Percentage 
Chance of Default 
5 
15 
25 
35 
45 
55 
65 
75 
85 
95 
Weighted Average 
Chance of Default 
Median Chance of Default 
Mode Chance of Default 
TABLE TWELVE C 
CamEbell 
Number of 

ResEonses 

19 
4 
6 
3 
2 
1 
3 
0 
0 
2 -
40 
Points 
95 
60 
150 
105 
90 
55 
195 
0 
0 
190 
940 
23.5% 
15% 
5% 
QUESTION FIVE: 
Edwards 
Number of 

ResEonses 

10 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
2 
6 
5 
3 
40 
-
46.2% 
50% 
5% 
Points 
50 
45 
50 
105 
90 
220 
130 
450 
425 
285 
1,850 
This question attempted to determine whether additional terms, 
such as restrictions on working capital, further debt, dividends, and 
officers' salaries, would be more restrictive for one of the companies. 
Of the 43 commercial lending officers responding to this question, 
three (7.0%) would have more restrictive terms for Campbell, twenty 
(46.5%) would have more restrictive terms for Edwards, and twenty 
(46.5%) would have equally restrictrive terms. 
TABLE THIRTEEN 
More restrictive for Campbell 
than for Edwards 
Less restrictive for Campbell 
than for Edwards 
Equally restrictive 
Number of 
ResEonses Percentage 
3 7.0% 
20 46.5 
20 46.5 
43 
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QUESTION SIX: 
This question gave the following proposition: "For purposes of 
this question only, assume that your bank had only $5 million avail­
able to lend. How much would be lent to Campbell? Edwards?" 
Twenty-four ofthe 38 bankers that responded to this question (63.2%) 
indicated they would lend more to Campbell. Four bankers (10.5%) 
would lend more to Edwards. Ten bankers (26.3%) would lend equal 
amounts to both companies. 
TABLE FOURTEEN 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Bankers who would lend more 
to Campbell 24 63.2% 
Bankers who would lend more 
to Edwards 4 10.5 
Bankers who would lend the 
same amount to both companies 10 26.3 
38 100.0 
QUESTION SEVEN: 
This question asked, "If, instead of a term loan, Campbell and 
Edwards each applied for an unsecured line of credit, what is the max­
imum line your bank would be willing to grant to Campbell? Ed­
wards?" Of the 37 lending officers responding to this question, twenty 
(54.1 %) would grant a larger line to Campbell, two (5.4%) would 
grant a larger line to Edwards, and fifteen (40.5%) would grant an 
equal line to both companies. 
Fifteen bankers (40.5%) would grant a line of credit to both com­
panies. Thirteen (35.1 %) would grant a line of credit to Campbell but 
not to Edwards. None of the bankers would grant a line to Edwards 
but not Campbell. Nine respondents (24.3%) would not grant a credit 
line to either company. 
--
--
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TABLE FIFTEEN A 

Number of 
Responses 
Bankers who would grant a 
larger line to Campbell 20 
Bankers who would grant a 
larger line to Edwards 2 
Bankers who would grant the 
same line of credit to Campbell 
and Edwards -15 
37 
-
TABLE FIFTEEN B 
Number of 
Responses 
Bankers granting a line of credit 
to both Campbell and Edwards 15 
Bankers granting a line of credit 
to Campbell but not to Edwards 13 
Bankers granting a line of credit 
to Edwards but not to Campbell 0 
Bankers not granting a line of 
credit either to Campbell or 
Edwards 9 
37 
-
QUESTION EIGHT: 
Percentage 
54.1% 
5.4 
40.5 
100.0 
Percentage 
40.5% 
35.1 
0 
24.3 
This question was stated as follows: "If your bank. would treat 
applications by Campbell and Edwards differently, please indicate the 
reasons for the different treatments. Feel free to use more space if 
needed." 
Banks favoring Campbell Corporation cited the following 
reasons: 
1. 	 Campbell obviously has much better control of operating costs 
and has taken steps to position itself for the future. 
2. 	 Edwards' ratios in debt to worth are disturbing and his situa­
tion is deteriorating by the years indicated. The Edwards situ­
ation should indicate additional caution. 
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3. 	 Both loans are marginal and should not be made. 
4. 	 I would work toward securing both credits. Edwards would 
have to be secured in order to extend the credit; however, with 
negative cash flow it still would be a questionable credit. 
5. 	 The Edwards statement would need additional explanation to 
credit committees because of the policy of expensing rather 
than capitalizing software development costs, causing higher 
variation of earnings and a loss in the most recent fiscal year. 
6. 	 Campbell has had two profit years in excess of $2 million. Ed­
wards perfonnance is very marginal. Edwards would be inca­
pable of repaying the loan from earnings. 
7. 	 Edwards' loss and deficit net worth would preclude our help­
ing them. 
8. 	 If lent, both loans would have to be secured. We would need 
more infonnation on the reasons for Edwards' loss. 
9. 	 I would have to recommend declining the loan request for 
both companies based on the following reasons: 
(1) 	 The highly speculative use of funds. 
(2) 	 The research and development nature of operations. 
(3) 	 The five year unamortized tenn of loan. 
(4) 	 The unsecured status. 
(5) 	 Declining TNW trend and increasing leverage. 
(6) 	 Declining profit margins and loss posted by the Edwards 
Corporation. 
(7) 	 Concentration of net worth in fixed assests. 
These companies . . . could possibly be serviced by asset­
based lending if they would agree to loans against a fonnula 
based on accounts receivable. Right now, Edwards Corpora­
tion does not have the cash flow to service the debt in a single 
payment sum and while Campbell Corporation does show suf­
ficient cash flow, they are looking at a five year tenn before 
repayment and who's to say what cash flow would be like at 
the end of five years. . . ? Another option for the bank, if we 
were to lend to Campbell Corporation, would be to lend 
against an escrow account established with our trust depart­
ment, into which amortization expense is deposited, invested 
for additional income, and then used to repay our loan at the 
end of the five-year tenn. 
10. 	 Because of the $6 million unsecured line, additional unsecured 
money would be hard to obtain. Edwards would only be 
granted on a secured basis. Treatment would be different be­
cause of the expenses, profits, capital and other ratios. 
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11. 	 Difference in net worth, debt to worth, all profitability ratios, 
ability to service, repayment requested. 
12. 	 Trends look much better for Campbell. 
13. 	 Campbell appears to have better liquidity than Edwards at 
present and would be more able to service long term debt. 
14. 	 Profitability and debt position of Campbell make it the much 
more desirable loan. Edwards debt position makes them more 
susceptible to rate risk. 
15. 	 Management of operating costs in an expanding market ap­
pears to be handled much better by Campbell than Edwards. 
Generated cash flow more evident by Campbell. 
16. 	 These credits would scare the hell out of upper management. 
My bank would not consider the loan request on unsecured 
terms. (This respondent would grant a loan to Campbell but 
not Edwards.) 
17. 	 Campbell is profitable and has positive cash flow to service 
debt. Edwards is unprofitable, cash flow does not service cur­
.rent charges, and expenses are rising faster than sales on a per­
centage basis. 
Banks favoring Edwards Corporation gave the following reasons: 
1. 	 Different methods of accounting for computer software and ed­
ucational courseware construction costs. 
2. 	 Companies are identical except that Edwards is more conserva­
tive. I assume the IRS accepts both capitalization and direct 
expense. 
3. 	 Due to the nature of software industry, expensing as incurred is . 
more prudent. 
4. 	 In today's every-changing software business Edwards' policy of 
charging existing software costs to operations results in a more 
conservative financial presentation rather than capitalizing 
them as does Campbell. 
Bankers treating both companies equally cited the following 
reasons: 
1. 	 I do not make loans based only on financial statements and, 
therefore, cannot definitively answer the questions. I would 
weigh each statement the same in my decision but would trust 
information from Edwards more than that from Campbell. 
2. 	 Edwards uses a more conservative approach to recording the 
software costs by expensing rather than capitalizing. This, 
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however, is still not enough to grant Edwards the loan instead 
of Campbell. Both loans are risky due to the nature of the 
equipment and the uncertainty of its marketability. Neither 
company in our opinion deserves unsecured credit. 
3. 	 No difference. Different accounting for construction costs cre­
ates the impression that Campbell earns a profit when the con­
struction cost puts it into a loss position. Rapid growth and 
expansion a mixed blessing. Would require marketable security 
to both borrowers. 
4. 	 Generally the same. Balance sheets only reflect different han­
dling of software. Campbell may find more credit available due 
to statement looks, thereby weakening current financial 
strength. 
5. 	 Would treat both requests the same as the only difference be­
tween the two appears to be accounting treatment of software. 
Not enough information to decline or approve loan. To do 
properly your questionnaire takes more time than is proper to 
request. This could make any results invalid. 
6. 	 Although Campbell Corporation's financial statements might 
appear more favorable at first glance, an experienced loan or 
credit officer will recognize the differences in the two compa­
nies' financial statements are due to the decision that (1) ac­
counting treatment for Campbell Corporation and another 
accounting treatment for Edwards Corporation. 
7. 	 No difference-same basic economic facts--merely different ac­
counting presentations. 
One banker who did not return the survey telephoned the Na­
tional Association of Accountants to say that he felt the questionnaire 
was an insult to his intelligence. He stated that anyone who gave a 
different response did not read the material. 
QUESTION NINE: 
The bank's total assets are: 
TABLE SIXTEEN A 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
More than $5 billion 6 13.6% 
$5 billion or less 38 86.4 
44 100.0 
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TABLE SIXTEEN B 

Banks having assets of 
More 
than $5 $5 billion 
billion or less 
Bankers favoring Campbell 2 26 
Bankers favoring Edwards 1 4 
Bankers treating Campbell 
and Edwards equally-no 
reason given 2 4 
Bankers treating Campbell 
and Edwards equally because 
accounting policy should not 
affect the lending decision 1 4 
6 38 
QUESTION TEN 
This question asked the respondent to indicate the number of 
years lending experience. Half of the respondents (50.0%) had six 
years experience or less. A few (4.8%) had more than 25 years lend­
ing experience. 
TABLE SEVENTEEN 
Number of 
Years Experience Responses Percentage 
o to 3 10 23.8% 
3+ to 6 11 26.2 
6+ to 10 8 19.0 
10+ to 15 5 11.9 
15+ to 25 6 14.3 
More than 25 2 4.8 
42 100.0% 
QUESTION ELEVEN: 
Responses to this question, inquiring about the position of the 
respondent, indicated that senior officers represented the smallest por­
tion of the sample (6.7%), followed by non-officers (13.3%), officers 
(35.6%) and assistant officers (44.4%). 
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TABLE EIGHTEEN 

Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Senior or executive vice 
president or other senior 
officer 3 6.7% 
Vice president, secretary 
or treasurer 16 35.6 
Assistant vice president or 
other assistant officer 20 44.4 
Not an officer 6 13.3 
45 
QUESTION TWELVE: 
Lending officers responding to this survey were geographically lo­
cated in the Northeast (22.2%), South (22.2%), North Central 
(44.4%) and West (11.1 %). 
TABLE NINETEEN 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Northeast 10 22.2% 
South 10 22.2 
North Central 20 44.4 
West 5 11.1 
45 
V. RESULTS OF THE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS SURVEY 
In order to determine whether software accounting policy has an 
effect on stock price, a questionnaire was sent to 803 financial analysts. 
Two hundred ninety-seven names were purchased from the Financial 
Analysts Federation and consisted of financial analysts that specialize 
in the computer or software industry. The remaining 506 analysts 
were chosen at random from a listing of financial analysts that are 
members of the New York City chapter of the Financial Analysts Fed­
eration. Forty-eight data packets were returned as undeliverable. Fif­
teen usable responses were received, for a response rate of about 2 
percent. Each analyst received the financial data for both Campbell 
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Corporation and Edwards Corporation, a listing of ratios, a question­
naire, cover letter and postpaid return envelope. 
Of the fifteen usable responses received, five favored Campbell, 
four favored Edwards, one had mixed feelings, and five analysts 
treated Campbell and Edwards equally. The background information 
needed to complete the questionnaire was as follows: 3 ! 
The two fictitious companies to be compared in this study are 
Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation. The setting of 
the study is as follows: Suppose you are to consult an individual 
investor, named George Madison, with respect to his personal in­
vestment portfolio. Mr. Madison is a vice president of a large man­
ufacturing corporation and is a resident of your city. He is 
acquainted with Andrew Monroe, the president of Campbell Corpo­
. ration and Lyndon Adams, the president of Edwards Corporation. 
Mr. Madison confronts you with an annual report for each of these 
companies and asks you to compare them as jovestment alterna­
tives. Mr. Madison is 32 years old, single, and in excellent health. 
His salary provides more than enough income for his present needs. 
He has $50,000 in cash which he desires to invest in common 
stocks, preferably stocks which appear likely to have substantial 
price growth over the next five to ten years. 
QUESTION ONE: 
If Mr. Madison wants to allocate $30,000 between these two in­
vestment alternatives, what proportions would you recommend for 
each common stock offering? (The percentage allocable to Campbell 
and Edwards is supposed to total 100%). Three of 13 respondents 
(23.1 %) would allocate more money to Campbell, five (38.5%) would 
allocate more to Edwards and five (38.5%) would allocate the same 
percentage to each company. 
31. A similar approach was taken by Robert E. Jensen in his doctoral dissertation at 
Stanford University. That study investigated relationships between security evaluation and 
portfolio selection and alternative inventory valuation and depreciation methods in finan­
cial reporting. See Jensen, An Experimental Design for Study ofEffects ofAccounting Vari­
ations in Decision Making, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Autumn 1966 at 224. 
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TABLE TWENTY 

Respondent Campbell Edwards 
1 0% 0% 
2 80 20 
3 70 30 
4 
5 75 25 
60 100 
7 25 75 
8 25 75 
9 0 100 
10 0 100 
11 
12 50 50 
13 50 50 
14 50 50 
15 50 50 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
More to Campbell 3 23.1% 
More to Edwards 5 38.5 
Same amount to each 5 38.5 
13 
QUESTION Two: 
Given only the information provided, what value or price share would 
you place on the common stock of these two companies at their 
annual report dates ?32 
Of the thirteen analysts responding to this question, six (46.2%) 
would assign a higher price to Campbell stock than to that of Ed­
wards, three (23.1 %) would assign a higher price for Edwards stock, 
and four (30.8%) would assign the same price to each stock. The 
mean and median price for Campbell stock were both higher than 
32. The financial infonnation for Campbell Corporation for 1981-1983 is actually the 
financial data for Comserv Corporation for 1980-1982. The dates were changed for pur­
poses of this study to make the financials appear more current. The financials for Edwards 
Corporation for 1981-1983 actually reflect what Comserv Corporation's financials for 1980­
1982 would have actually appeared if Comserv had expensed all software costs as incurred. 
Comserv's actual stock price for 1982 fluctuated between $11.50 and $19.75. For 1981, it 
fluctuated between $9.17 and $16.00. 
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those for Edwards, and the most commonly assigned price for each 
stock was $10. The range between high and low price was greater for 
Campbell ($30) than for Edwards ($17.50). 
TABLE TWENTy-ONE 
Price Per Share 
Respondent Campbell Edwards 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
$ 7.00 
5.50 
$ 20.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 8.00 
$ 5.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 31.00 
$ 5.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 4.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 1.50 
$ 10.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 7.50 
$ 12.00 
$ 2.50 
$ 6.00 
$ 19.00 
$ 5.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 4.00 
Median 
Median 
Mode 
Range 
$ 9.73 
$ 8.00 
$ 10.00 
$1.00 $31.00=$30.00 
$ 7.19 
$ 6.00 
$ 10.00 
$1.50 $19.00=$17.50 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Higher price for Campbell 6 46.2% 
Higher price for Edwards 3 23.1 
Same price for both 4 30.8 
13 
-
QUESTION THREE AND FOUR: 
This question asked the respondent to rank an investment in 
Campbell and Edwards stock according to risk. The majority of re­
spondents rated an investment in Campbell to be either extremely 
risky (35.7%) or risky (42.9%). Most analysts also considered an in­
vestment in Edwards to be either extremely risky (21.4%) or risky 
-
- -
-
-
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(50.0%). If point values are assigned for degrees of risk, Campbell 
(4.07) is found to be slightly more risky than Edwards (3.86). More 
than one-third of the respondents (35.7%) rated Campbell as riskier 
than Edwards, or just as risky (35.7%). A somewhat smaller group 
(28.6%) thought Edwards to be the riskier investment. 
TABLE TWENTY-TwO 
CamEbell Edwards 
Number of Number of 
ResEonses % Responses % 
Extremely risky 5 35.7% 3 21.4% 
Risky 6 42.9 7 50.0 
Marginal 2 14.3 3 21.4 
Safe 1 7.1 1 7.1 
Extremely safe 0 0 
14 14 
Number of Number of 
Points Responses Points ResEonses Points 
Extremely risky 5 5 25 3 15 
Risky 4 6 24 7 28 
Marginal 3 2 6 3 9 
Safe 2 1 2 1 2 
Extremely safe 1 0 0 
14 57 14 57 
Weighted Average 4.07 3.86 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Campbell is more risky 5 35.7% 
Edwards is more risky 4 28.6 
Both are equally risky 5 35.7 
QUESTION FIVE: 
Three respondents (20.0%) thought Campbell would experience 
more rapid growth than Edwards over the next five years. Two ana­
lysts (13.3%) thought Edwards would grow faster. An equal number 
of analysts either thought the companies would experience equal 
growth (33.3%%) or had no opinion (33.3%). 
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TABLE TWENTY-THREE 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Campbell 3 20.0% 
Edwards 2 13.3 
Equal growth 5 33.3 
No opinion 5 33.3 
15 
QUESTION SIX: 
When asked to state reasons for the answers given to the first five 
questions, the analysts favoring Campbell Corporation said: 
1. 	 While Edwards sales have grown considerably, its margins indi­
cate poor management, its cash flow has gone negative and it 
has already borrowed more than its worth. Campbell is in bet­
ter control of its expenses and has some positive trends with 
decent rates of return, even though it is leveraged. 
2. 	 While little information is given as to the state of the art of 
either company, its place in the software industry and/or other 
pertinent management factors, this questionnaire appears to me 
to be constructed around whether I would invest in a computer 
software company which either expenses or capitalizes R&D 
construction costs. This has not been resolved yet by the SEC 
of ADAPSO. However, based on the paucity of data presented, 
I still favor Campbell Corporation for its long-term solvency as 
well as leverage factors plus software. 
3. 	 Looks like same company with different accounting (Com­
serv?). Hard to assign value without knowing details of "con­
struction costs"-for example, will there continue to be 30% of 
revenues in next couple of years? However, the stock market 
would probably value Campbell at a higher price since it is 
showing 'profits'. 
4. 	 Since an 'investment' (speculation would be more accurate) 
must be made, prudence dictates that the great bulk of the 
money ought to be applied to the 'safest' equity, Campbell. If 
Edwards grows more, not all is lost. Earnings are better than 
no earnings. In the absence of earnings, book value must suffice 
as a basis for pricing; this is the basis behind Question 2 ($8 for 
Campbell, $3 for Edwards). In the absence of a satisfactory as­
set base, the only predicate for investment is least risk (P-E) or 
pure guesswork; so much for Questions 3 and 4 (Campbell ­
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risky, Edwards-extremely risky). Answer to Question 5 (no 
opinion) implies strongly that there is not satisfactory basis for 
projection of growth. 
Analysts preferring Edwards Corporation had the following 
comments: 
1. 	 Difference turns on capitalizing (Campbell) or expensing 
software development and purchases (Edwards). 
Write-off understates earnings initially since it ignores the in­
vestment aspect. Later earnings are overstated since develop­
ment costs were charged earlier. 
Edwards will be worth higher PIE since no surprise write-off of 
unsuccessful products and company likely more soberly view­
so easier to finance growth. 
Both companies are making heavy up-front software R&D in­
vestments-somewhat masking a profitable business. Needs 
analyses of sales and profits generated by earlier software R&D 
expenditures for evaluation of both companies. 
2. 	 Capitalization of software expense at Campbell Corporation 
lowers quality of reported earnings. Any changes (short-term) 
in technology could subject Campbell to write-offs. Also, debt 
ratios are high given poor quality of earnings. Both companies 
are small and subject to large company competition. 
3. 	 It remains to be seen whether the cost increase incurred to buy 
revenue increases in 1983 will prove profitable. That will re­
quire (a) strong further revenue growth and/or (b) ability to cut 
cost without impairing revenue and (c) ability to maintain ex­
isting business. For each company I judge underlying earnings 
may roughly be $2.50. I give Edwards a lOX multiple and 
Campbell a 4X because Edwards' cost capitalization increases 
risk and dampens upward earnings response if things go well. 
If either software product is unique, and is going to be a barn 
burner, these financials don't show it. 
4. 	 Question 1 through 4 reflect Campbell earnings being over­
stated while Edwards understated-but Wall Street pricing re­
flecting current reported EPS. This questionnaire is incredibly 
stupid-the development capitalization issue deserves a more 
intelligent consideration by the accounting and investment 
communities. 
The responsed one analyst was mixed. Although 100% of invest­
ment funds (Question 1) would be allocated to Edwards, Campbell's 
stock ($31) is valued higher than Edwards' ($19). Campbell is consid­
743 1985] SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING 
ered to be an extremely risky investment, whereas an investment in 
Edwards is considered safe. Campbell is expected to experience more 
growth over the next five years. The following reasons were given by 
this analyst for these responses: 
Question 1 .(Allocate 100% to Edwards) 
While Campbell appears to be growing more rapidly and has 
stronger profitability ratios, its accounting is responsible for jazzing 
up the numbers vis a vis Edwards. Like many companies in the 
software group (CMSV, AAC) Campbell's financials are built on a 
house of cards. 
Question 2 (Stock Price-Campbell $31; Edwards $19) 
Because investors do not discriminate regarding quality of earnings, 
Campbell's record appears more solid. Thus, I have arbitrarily as­
signed a value to Campbell of five times revenues which is how the 
market values similar companies. I have accorded a lower valua­
tion-three times revenues to Edwards. Likewise, investors using 
some factor of book value to value the investment would start off on 
a higher base with Campbell, whose book value would include $15 
million in software plus education construction costs as assets, 
whereas Edwards books none. 
Questions 3 & 4 (Campbell-extremely risky; Edwards-safe) 
For reasons highlighted in Question 1 and Question 2 above, I con­
sider Campbell's accounting to fly in the face of conservatism, 
which oftentimes catches up with companies. I feel the low quality 
of its earnings impairs its suitability as an investment, especially 
when one is looking out five to ten years. It could be suitable for a 
short-term trader with a six month time horizon. 
Question 5 (Campbell will experience more growth) 
In the early stages of product development, Campbell will be defer­
ring more of its costs, while Edwards will be expensing its costs. 
Therefore, Campbell will appear to have more rapid earnings 
growth. 
General Comment: 
Do not agree with Campbell's method of accounting for what it 
calls "computer software and educational courseware construction 
costs." Construction implies product development, not enhance­
ments, and I question the suitability under F ASB No.2 in deferring 
these costs. 
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Some analysts treated both companies equally. Their comments 
were as follows: 
1. 	 Companies are the same except for accounting treatment of 
computer software and education courseware construction 
costs. 
(Campbell is) Riskier than Edwards because more aggressive 
accounting, but this issue is being debated-amortization and 
capitalization may more clearly portray match of income vs. 
expense but is more open to abuse. 
2. 	 Obviously the two companies are the same except for the ac­
counting treatment of software development cost. The account­
ing treatment has little bearing on the fundamental worth of a 
company. The two are of equal but low value. Both are risky, 
unprofitable and unseasoned. 
3. 	 These companies are identical as to business and their potential 
growth rates. The financial statements are identical except that 
Edwards writes off its courseware construction costs and 
Campbell amortizes them. For most investors this is mislead­
ing but for evaluation purposes both companies must be valued 
using comparative accounting methods. While Edwards ac­
counting is more conservative than Campbell's, both companies 
should have the same stock price. 
4. 	 Obviously the same company using different accounting rules. 
5. 	 You are asking questions about an industry that defies analysis 
on basis of accounting. As an advisor, given risk assumption of 
Mr. Madison, I'd suggest buying both. 
Several analysts returned the questionnaires blank, or with minor 
notations. Their comments were as follows: 
1. 	 While this questionnaire is very short, the work involved in 
fully answering it will take more time than either my company 
or myself is willing to invest. 
2. 	 A quick review of the materials you sent me recently leads me 
to estimate this would require about three hours of work to read 
and analyze the material. I would be willing to do this but can't 
justify it to my firm. They would probably want me to charge a 
standard consulting fee, but since this would run around $300/ 
hour I doubt that this is feasible. 
3. 	 Not enough information. Stocks are and should not be evalu­
ated on financial statements alone-management, reputation, 
etc., is critical. 
4. 	 I am sorry you are asking me to give you two or three hours of 
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my time-at $100 an hour that's $300 you would owe me ... I 
suggest you hire some financial analysts as consultants. 
5. 	 You have omitted too much information to develop any reason­
able values for two companies which differ only in how certain 
costs are either expensed or amortized. Even with other impor­
tant data, this valuation process is involved and time-consum­
ing (and expensive at my rate of $120 per hour). 
If you wanted to know how analysts view capitalization vs. ex­
pensing, you should have designed your survey that way. 
QUESTION SEVEN: 
Eight of the fifteen respondents (53.3%), when asked if they con­
sidered themselves to be specialists in the software industry, responded 
in the affirmative. 
TABLE TwENTY-FOUR 
Yes 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Yes 
No 
8 
7 
53.3% 
46.7 
15 
-
100.0 
- ­
VI. THE VIEWS OF SOFfWARE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 

EXECUTIVES ON THE EFFECT OF SOFfWARE 

ACCOUNTING POLICY ON BANK LENDING 

DECISIONS 

Material for this part was taken from a survey of software vend­
ing company executives. 33 
QUESTION TwELVE: 
Table 25 summarizes the views of the private and public compa­
nies regarding the effect of software accounting policy on the ability to 
raise capital. 
A slight majority of private companies disagreed with the state­
ment. However, the public companies disagreed with the statement by 
a margin of 4 to 1. 
33. 	 See McGee, supra note 17. 
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TABLE TWENTY-FIVE34 
The inability to include software costs on the balance sheet ad­
versely affects your ability to raise capital. 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Private Companies 
Agree 12 36.4% 
Disagree 17 51.5 
No opinion 4 12.1 
Firms not responding 4 
37 
Public Companies 
Agree 9 17.0% 
Disagree 37 69.8 
No opinion 7 13.2 
53 
Public and Private Combined 
Agree 21 24.4% 
Disagree 54 62.8 
No opinion 11 12.8 . 
Firms not responding 4 
90 
For those respondents who agreed with the statement, some of 
the reasons given were: 
1. 	 Companies that expense software construction costs are placed 
in an inferior position to those which capitalize such costs, espe­
cially in start-up situations. 
2. 	 Income producing assets need to be reflected on the balance 
sheet in order to fairly present the valuation of the company. A 
company would be grossly undervalued if these costs were ex­
pensed immediately. 
3. 	 Banks treat financial statements very literally. 
4. 	 Expensing software costs adversely affects current earnings. 
5. 	 Privately owned companies and companies that are not a sub­
sidiary of a major conglomerate are at a definite disadvantage if 
they expense software costs. 
34. 	 Some of the responses included two answers. 
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Those who disagreed did so for the following reasons: 
1. 	 Ability to raise capital is impacted by future revenues from 
software development rather than the current balance sheet. 
Expensing software construction costs actually improves future 
profitability. 
2. 	 Other indicia of financial strength and leverage (e.g., revenue 
projections, business plan, etc.) are more meaningful than 
software accounting policy. 
3. 	 The amounts involved are not material. 
4. 	 The investment community offers a different multiple to compa­
nies that capitalize software. Bankers tend to delete software 
from the balance sheet. 
5. 	 The ability to raise capital is a function of profit and loss and 
growth experience. (But how is profit and loss affected by a 
firm's software accounting policy?) 
6. 	 The majority of assets on many vendor company balance sheets 
consists of cash and receivables. 
7. 	 The market is sophisticated enough to know the software busi­
ness. Providers of capital to the software industry recognize 
special situations. 
8. 	 The cost of software on a balance sheet usually has no relation­
ship to its value. 
QUESTION THIRTEEN: 
Table 26 shows that the vast majority of both private and public 
companies do not think the interest rate they must pay on borrowed 
capital is adversely affected by the inability to include software costs 
on the balance sheet. 
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TABLE TWENTy-SIX 
The inability to include software costs on the balance sheet ad­
versely affects the interest rate your company must pay to obtain 
capital. 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
. Private Companies 
Agree 4 10.8% 
Disagree 24 64.9 
No opinion 9 24.3 
37 
-
Public Companies 
Agree 5 9.8% 
Disagree 38 74.5 
No opinion 8 15.7 
51 
-
Public and Private Combined 
Agree 9 10.2% 
Disagree 62 70.5 
No opinion 17 19.3 
88 
QUESTION SIXTEEN: 
Table 27 shows that the vast majority of both private and public 
firms do not think that expensing software construction costs ad­
versely affects long-term growth. Private and public companies dis­
agreed with the statement by ratios of two to one and five to one, 
respectively, which is even greater than the disagreement rate for 
Question 14, which asked basically the same question. On the other 
hand, a substantial minority of private firms (32.4%) do think that 
expensing software construction costs adversely affects long-term 
growth. 
749 1985] SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING 
TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN 

If all software development costs were expensed rather than capi­
talized, your company's long-term growth would be adversely affected. 
Number of 
Responses Percentage 
Private Companies 
Agree 
Disagree 
No opinion 
12 
24 
1 
32.4% 
64.9 
2.7 
37 
Public Companies 
Agree 
Disagree 
No opinion 
Firms not responding 
8 
38 
4 
1 
16.0% 
76.0 
8.0 
51 
Public and Private Combined 
Agree 
Disagree 
No opinion 
Firms not responding 
20 
62 
5 
1 
88 
23.0% 
71.3 
5.7 
VII. THE VIEWS OF SOFTWARE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 

EXECUTIVES ON THE EFFECT OF SOFTWARE 

ACCOUNTING POLICY ON STOCK PRICE AND 

GROWTH 
Material for this section was taken from a survey of software 
vending company executives.3s 
QUESTION FOURTEEN: 
Table 28 summarizes the view of private and public companies on 
the relationship of software accounting policy on investment and 
growth. A small majority of private companies (51.4%) feel that in­
vestment and growth would be inhibited by requiring software con­
struction costs to be expensed rather than capitalized. A substantial 
minority of public companies (33.3%) feel the same way. Overall, the 
35. See McGee, supra note 17. 
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sample firms are about evenly divided on the issue, with 40.7 percent 
agreeing, 43.0 percent disagreeing and 16.3 percent having no opinion. 
TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT 
If all software development costs were e:'pensed rather than capi­
talized, the level of these expenditures for software companies would 
have to be much lower,' companies would be forced to put a cap on in­
vestment in new product programs in order to reflect good earnings per­
formance to shareholders. 
Private Companies 

Agree 

Disagree 

No opinion 

Firms not responding 

Public Companies 

Agree 

Disagree 

No opinion 

Public and Private Combined 

Agree 

Disagree 

No opinion 

Firms not responding 

Number of 

Responses 

18 
16 
1 
2 
37 
17 
21 
13 
51 
35 
37 
14 
2 
88 
Percentage 
51.4% 
45.7 
2.9 
33.3% 
41.2 
25.5 
40.7% 
43.0 
16.3 
QUESTION FIFTEEN 
Table 29 shows that private companies are about evenly split on 
the question of whether expensing software adversely affects stock 
price. Public companies disagree by a two to one margin. Overall, a 
majority of companies (56.8%) disagrees that expensing software ad­
versely affects stock price. 
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TABLE TWENTy-NINE 
If all software development costs were expensed rather than capi­
talized, the price ofyour company's stock. ifpublicly traded, would be 
adversely affected. 
Private Companies 

Agree 

Disagree 

No opinion 

Public Companies 

Agree 

Disagree 

No opinion 

Public and Private Combined 

Agree 

Disagree 

No opinion 

Number of 

Responses 

17 

18 

2 

37 

16 

32 

3 

51 

33 

50 

5 

88 

Percentage 
45.9% 
48.6 
5.4 
31.4% 
62.7 
5.9 
37.5% 
56.8 
5.7 
